Dwane L. Sykes Et Al. v. Howard F. Hatch : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Dwane L. Sykes Et Al. v. Howard F. Hatch : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sam Primavera; Attorney for Appellee.
Spencer F. Hatch; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sykes v. Hatch, No. 960561 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/410
UTAH COURT OF AFPfcAW 
p*!EF 
UTAH 
KFU 
IN THE UTAH COURT 0$&PPEALS 
STATE OFUTAHV!0 9 /b 0 5 te 1 - CAr 
DWANE L. SYKES ET AL. 
PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES, 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
V. 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPELLEES 
REPV®MmW J&TETEEE ~ 
NO. 960561-CA 
Priority Number 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE / CROSS APPELLANT 
Reply brief in opposition to appeal from order granting Sykes' motion to amend 
judgment and altered and amended judgment. 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for Appellee and Cross Appellant Dwane Sykes 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 226-0993 
Spencer F. Hatch 
1433 Lakeview Drive, Suite 100 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
(801) 295-2214 
Attorney for Appellant Howard Hatch FILED 
" a h Court of ADneafs 
KB f 7 1997 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Cour 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DWANE L. SYKES ET AL. 
PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES, 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
V. 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPELLEES 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NO. 960561-CA 
Priority Number 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE / CROSS APPELLANT 
Reply brief in opposition to appeal from order granting Sykes' motion to amend 
judgment and altered and amended judgment. 
Sam Primavera (5413) 
Attorney for Appellee and Cross Appellant Dwane Sykes 
746 E. 3800 N. 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 226-0993 
Spencer F. Hatch 
1433 Lakeview Drive, Suite 100 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
(801) 295-2214 
Attorney for Appellant Howard Hatch 
i\\ m.r.orroNTKNTS 
Table of Authorities 3 
Arguments presented by Mr. Hatch 4 
Argument 4 
Mr Sykes was denied due process 6 
The secondary reasons given for the default of Mr. Sykes 
are " after the fact" attempts at justification 7 
Prior defaults are irrelevant 8 
Missed deadlines do not support default 9 
Informal documents do not justify default 9 
There was no subversion of the judicial process 10 
Conclusion 11 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CITATIONS: 
Wright. Federal Practice and Procedure. S2681. p.5(1983V 
See Utah Civil Practice ,David A. Thomas The Michie Company 1992 page 202. 
3 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY MR. HATCH 
1) Mr. Hatch argues that a default of Mr. Sykes was justified because: 
a) The witness list presented by Mr. Sykes was too long, 
b) Mr. Sykes was defaulted once before when he failed to appear for a final pre-trial 
conference, 
c) Mr. Sykes sent in motions and orders that were not according to form, 
2) Mr. Sykes was not denied due process because he was allowed to participate in the case. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Hatch makes a point that Mr. Sykes had been defaulted "Months ago on the issues, 
their only defense was to mitigate damages." That is simply untrue. The chronology of events is 
as follows: 
2 February 1995 Order Regarding Court Availability (R 1757). 
This is the order which defaulted Mr. Sykes. It was filed on the Thursday before 
the trial. Trial changed to one day bench trial limited only to the issue of damages. 
6 February 1995 Trial on the issue of damages 
The Court changed the trial once again from a one day bench trial to a three day 
jury trial. Mr. Sykes was granted without a moment to prepare, the opportunity to 
cross examine witnesses. 
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Mr. Sykes was not defaulted months before the trial on the issue of damages. Mr. Sykes 
was defaulted FOUR DAYS before the trial was scheduled (R 1757). 
Mr. Sykes also was not defaulted because he was defaulted before or because he sent in 
documents to the Court which were not according to form. The Court was quite definite on why 
Mr. Sykes was defaulted (R 1757): 
"Mr. Sykes has filed two witness lists, the first on January 9,1995 and the second on 
January 27,1995 The first list contains 64 names or titles of people. The second 
contains 73. These numbers exceed the limit. In fact these numbers greatly exceed 
the limit. That excess is the reason for this order" 
The Court defaulted Mr. Sykes because his witness list was too long. Apparently the 
Court simply did not realize that there had never been a limit imposed on the total number of 
witnesses that could be on the witness list. The trial Court specifically stated: 
"The plaintiffs and the defendant are limited to six character witnesses. 
There is no limit for the amount of fact witnesses, provided they are named on the 
final witness list. 
The clerk is to advise Judge Mower on January 10,1995, the total number of 
witnesses who will be called to testify at trial. This will assist Judge Mower to 
determine if additional trial time is required." (Minute entry, 9/2/94 [R 1363]). 
There was never a limit placed on the number of witnesses that were to be included on 
the witness list. Mr. Sykes did not at any time violate an order of the Court. It is standard practice 
in civil litigation to name witnesses on a witness list that may not be called. The underlying 
assumption is that, if necessary these people will be called but if not, or if time runs out, then 
they will not. A simple warning from the trial Court at the beginning of the trial such as: 
"Mr. Sykes you may use your time as you wish but you only have 17 hours in which 
to present your case." 
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would have been sufficient and infinitely less draconian. Instead of a simple warning, or to cut 
off Mr. Sykes' delivery of evidence when the time had expired, Mr. Sykes was defaulted by the 
Court. To default Mr. Sykes without warning and in direct contradiction of the prior order of the 
Court was an abuse of discretion. 
Mr. Hatch does not dispute the assertion that: 
No party should be defaulted unless the grounds upon which such default is 
authorized are clearly and authoritatively established and are in such clear and 
certain terms that the party to be defaulted can know, without question, that he is 
subject to default if he does not act in a certain fashion. 
See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure. §2681, p.5 (1983). 
It is undisputed that the Court stated that the number of witnesses on the witness list was 
unlimited. Mr. Sykes did not have a clue that he was subject to default because his witness list 
was too long. There were no clear and certain terms to rely on. There was no clear and 
authoritative statement to look to. The default of Mr. Sykes arrived in the mail as a bolt out of the 
blue three days before the trial was to start. 
MR. SYKES WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
Mr. Hatch contends that Mr. Sykes was not denied due process because he was allowed to 
"participate" in the trial. Mr. Hatch concedes that if the Thursday order of default of Mr. Sykes 
had been allowed to stand, that an argument could be made that due process had been denied. 
(See Brief of Appellant / Cross Appellee page 8.) The circumstances of Mr. Sykes participation 
are such that, for all intents and purposes, Mr. Sykes was denied the opportunity to defend. 
Under the Thursday order of default the Court stated: 
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"Consequently , this order is the default of Mr, Sykes. He will not be allowed to 
appear and defend this action [emphasis added]" 
When Mr. Sykes appeared in Court on 6 September 1995, he was present as a spectator. This fact 
is indicated by the record. The Court, in addressing the jury at the beginning of the trial, stated: 
"You'll notice that this table right over here where the defendant would usually be 
is not occupied by anybody, and there's lots of reasons for that. As far as you're 
concerned, you don't need to know that at this point." [R2638] 
When Mr. Sykes arrived in Court he discovered that the case had been changed from a bench 
trial to a jury trial [R2644]. In further discussion Mr. Sykes was allowed to cross examine 
witnesses but was allowed to call only two. Mr. Sykes did not even begin participating in the trial 
until after jury selection was complete and Mr. Hatch was half way into his opening statement 
[R2701]. Mr. Sykes has proven that he is not the most skilled litigator that Utah has ever seen. 
But, even the best of trial lawyers would find himself at a tremendous disadvantage if he were 
forced to try a case with no preparation and with an extremely limited ability to call witnesses. 
Plus, Mr. Sykes had already been defaulted as to the issue of liability and his only defense would 
be to mitigate damages. Such a defense would require a very skillful presentation and a thorough 
knowledge of the underlying law. Mr. Sykes was not prepared in either area. So, as Mr. Hatch 
has himself admitted, if the Thursday order of default was allowed to stand, Mr. Sykes was 
constitutionally impaired. The trial Court's last minute reversal on the issue of a jury trial and on 
the question of Mr. Sykes' participation in the trial did not give Mr. Sykes sufficient time to 
prepare an adequate defense. Mr. Sykes was denied due process. 
THE SECONDARY REASONS GIVEN FOR THE DEFAULT OF MR. SYKES 
ARE "AFTER THE FACT" ATTEMPTS AT JUSTIFICATION 
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Mr. Hatch quotes at length from the "order of default" (R 2059) issued by the trial court 
three months after the trial and three months after Mr. Sykes had been defaulted. The reasons 
given by the court and quoted by Mr. Hatch are that (R2059): 
1) Mr. Sykes had been defaulted before, 
2) The time deadlines were not properly complied with, 
3) The court received a myriad of motions that did not meet the form requirements set 
down by the rules, 
4) Mr. Sykes exhibited a manifest intention of subverting the judicial system. 
PRIOR DEFAULTS ARE IRRELEVANT 
Mr. Sykes previously being defaulted does not justify a default now. The defaults 
mentioned are a failure to answer the original complaint and an amended complaint. These are 
probably the least significant of all defaults. Indeed, it is probably improper for the Court to 
default a party at all for failure to answer an amended complaint. The importance of an answer is, 
first and foremost, to demonstrate the intent to defend the action and second to clarify any points 
of disagreement. 
" However, almost any response by the defendant will be enough to preclude 
entry of default and, at the very least, shift an attempt for summary disposition to a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. Thus if a 
defendant, acting without legal counsel, responds to service of summons and 
complaint by writing a letter to the court which addresses at least some of the issues 
in the complaint, the court will probably not permit entry of default or default 
judgment Even if the defendant in that instance has not submitted a pleading that 
meets the requirements for either form or content of pleadings, the court must 
consider that an appearance has been made and that it is possible to try the case on 
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the merits. Once a responsive pleading or motion has been submitted and is not 
subsequently stricken or withdrawn, then a default judgment is no longer the 
method for obtaining summary disposition of the case. 
See Utah Civil Practice ,David A. Thomas The Michie Company 1992 page 202. 
So the lack of response of Mr. Sykes to an amended complaint is not the proper vehicle to force a 
default. But, the previous default had nothing to do with the actual reason that Mr. Sykes was 
defaulted. The previous decisions could either stand on their own merits or they could not. 
MISSED DEADLINES DO NOT SUPPORT DEFAULT 
The Court does not explain the failure to meet time deadlines very clearly. The court does 
mention the witness and exhibit list. If the Court is saying that Mr. Sykes was defaulted because 
the witness list was late then it is just substituting one abuse of discretion for another. Late 
witness lists seem to be a rule rather than the exception in civil litigation. But, if the witness list 
was late, where was the prejudice to Mr. Hatch? The case was 15+ years old. Discovery had been 
concluded long before. We had already once been before the Court of Appeals, when the trial 
Court dismissed the claims of Mr. Hatch, which the Appeals Court reversed. Where was the 
"subversion" of the judicial process? The most onerous sanction that one would expect from a 
late witness list would be the exclusion of those witnesses or perhaps money sanctions. But, a 
complete default of Mr. Sykes for a late witness list is simply unjustified and an abuse of 
discretion. 
INFORMAL DOCUMENTS DO NOT JUSTIFY DEFAULT 
The next reason given by the Court is that Mr. Sykes sent in a myriad of documents 
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which were not correct as to form. Again, the total default of Mr. Sykes for this reason is far 
more draconian than is justifiable. A simple denial of all such motions would have disposed of 
the problem. But a review of the record will show that both Mr. Sykes and Mr. Sykes contributed 
numerous redundant documents to the Court. If this was the reason for the default, then both 
parties should have been defaulted together. 
THERE WAS NO SUBVERSION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
There is little to no evidence of an attempt by Mr. Sykes to subvert the judicial process. 
Indeed, the trial court had already ruled against Mr. Hatch (and in favor of Mr. Sykes) in a 
summary judgment which was subsequently reversed by this court. If Mr. Sykes were truly 
subversive of the judicial process then such a ruling would not have been appropriate at all. 
So, even the justification attempted by the Court three months after the initial default is 
not appropriate grounds for the most severe sanction of default. But truly these [R2059] after the 
fact justifications are an attempt to justify the unjustifiable. The true reason for the default of Mr. 
Sykes was given in the original order of default [R1757]. The Court felt that Mr. Sykes witness 
list was too long. That is the opinion given at the time. That is the explicit reason given for Mr. 
Sykes' default in the order. Counsel for Mr. Hatch is correct in attempting to justify the default 
by the use of [R2059]. Certainly [R1757] can not stand on its own. But even those three month 
delayed justifications are insufficient to justify a complete default of Mr. Sykes 4 days before the 
trial.. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court was very clear in its order (R1757) that Mr. Sykes was being defaulted for 
having a witness list that is too long. Three months after the trial the Court issued (R 2059) 
which added additional reasons. None of these reasons justify the actions of the Court. Mr. Sykes 
was denied due process and the Court abused its decision in refusing to allow him to defend 
himself. The last second acquiescence of the Court in allowing Mr. Sykes to cross examine 
witnesses did not cure this abuse. Mr. Sykes could not possibly defend himself in any reasonable 
manner given no time at all to prepare. 
Mr. Sykes deserves his day in court. Mr. Sykes asks this Court to vacate the verdict of the 
Court and to remand for a new trial. 
<&^2 <P 
Sam Primavera 
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